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(vii) Review of Fatal Accident at Narora Atomic (b) strengthening hydrogen management provisions,
Power Station (NAPS)
(c) provision of containment filtered venting, and
An incident had occurred at NAPS on July 11,
2018, which resulted in fatality of one contract person. (d) creation of on-site emergency support centre.
During the event, victim fell from the bund wall of 1.2 These required research & development efforts,
meter height and subsequently succumbed to death. analysis, detailed engineering and testing/qualification.
Review of this event indicated deficiencies in the safety The severe accident management guidelines for different
management during performance of this activity. In NPP designs (PHWR, BWR & PWR) were developed
the light of this event, AERB had issued directive that based on technical bases reviewed & accepted by AERB
all DAE units should prepare a list of routine and non- and are now in place at all NPPs. The activities related to
routine activities being carried out in their premises. Job R&D, engineering, testing & qualification related to the
specific Hazard Analysis should be performed for all rest of the long term enhancements have been completed
the identified activities. Steps should be taken to ensure and their on-site implementation is now in progress. The
adherence to safety requirements and ensuring safety present status of long term safety upgrades/measures is
supervision especially during non-routine works at site. as below:

(viii) Permission for Irradiation Campaign of FBTR (a) Strengthening Hydrogen Management
The 27 irradiation campaign of Fast Breeder Test Provisions
th
Reactor (FBTR) was conducted during September The hydrogen management scheme in Indian
29, 2018 to January 30, 2019. Subsequently, FBTR PHWRs includes provision of suitable number of
th
sought permission for 28 irradiation campaign. The Passive Catalytic Recombiner Devices (PCRD) along
th
main objectives of 28 campaign were continuation with provisions for homogenizing the containment
of irradiation of sodium bonded metallic fuel pins, atmosphere and maintenance of the inert steam
irradiation of Tungsten Carbide capsule (grid plate atmosphere. Activities related to indigenous
potential material), continuation of long term irradiation development, testing and qualification of PCRDs
of structural materials and irradiation of actinide samples. addressing the post-accident hydrogen management
Based on review of application, AERB permitted the needs for the Indian PHWR containments have been
commencement of 28 irradiation campaign of FBTR. completed. Installation of PCRDs along with the
th
The campaign was conducted during April 02 to associated instrumentation and equipment of Post-
September 30, 2019. Subsequently, based on review, Accident Hydrogen Management System (PAHMS) is
th
permission for commencement of 29 irradiation in progress in the operating NPPs. PCRDs have been
campaign has also been granted. installed in MAPS-2, KGS-1&2, NAPS-1, KAPS-1
1.3.4 Safety Assessment of Operating NPPs in and RAPS-5. For the PWR units of KKNPP-1&2, the
Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PARs) for hydrogen
the wake of Fukushima Accident management are already incorporated as part of the
design. In TAPS-1&2, containment inerting system has
Safety assessments carried out post Fukushima been indigenously refurbished and the system is put in
NPP accident had indicated that Indian NPPs have operation.
inherent strength in dealing with external hazards.
However, certain safety enhancements were identified (b) Provision of Containment Filtered Venting
for strengthening the defences against rare external System (CFVS)
events exceeding the design bases and enhancing severe
accident mitigation capabilities. These actions were Technology development of CFVS System has
classified as short, medium and long term measures/ been completed and detailed engineering of the system
safety upgrades. Implementations of short and medium has been finalized after analysis and testing. CFVS
term safety measures/upgrades have been already has been installed in TAPS-1&2 (BWR). Installation of
completed. CFVS is in progress in PHWR based NPPs, where the
requirement has been envisaged. For the PWR units at
The long term enhancements identified were; KKNPP-1&2, the requirement of containment venting
(a) enhancing severe accident management programme, is not envisaged.

14 AERB Annual Report 2019