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During  the  year, 8 meetings  were held  for  (e) DFRP and FRFCF
           authorization/re-authorization  of operating  personnel
           from HWP and NFC, and total of 87 candidates were        There was no major reportable incident calling for
           authorised/re-authorizes, as detailed below:          enforcement actions during commissioning activities at
                                                                 DFRP and construction at FRFCF.
           (i)  Licensing committee of Heavy Water Plants met on
               six occasions and 63 operation personnel (Shift In-  (f)  NFC-Kota
               charge, field Engineer and Control Panel Operator)   Construction of the plant buildings is under progress
               were authorized/ re-authorized.
                                                                 at NFC-Kota Site. There was no major reportable
           (ii)  Licensing committee of Nuclear Fuel Complex met   incident at NFC-K calling for enforcement actions during
               on two occasions and 24 operation personnel (Shift   the period.
               In-charge) were authorized/re-authorized.
                                                                 1.5.2 Safety Performance of Nuclear Facilities
           1.5  OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE  OF                         in Operation
                NUCLEAR FACILITIES
                                                                    The operational performance and significant events
           1.5.1 Safety Performance of Nuclear Facilities        are reviewed  and  the required modifications  were
                 under Construction                              implemented.  The operational performance of all the
                                                                 NPPs remained satisfactory. TAPS-1 to 4, RAPS-2 to
           (a) KKNPP–3 to 6                                      6, KGS-1 to 4, MAPS-2, NAPS-1&2, KKNPP-1&2 and
                                                                 KAPS-2 were operational. KAPS-1 was synchronized to
              There was  one fatal accident at the temporary  grid after satisfactory completion of EMCCR activities
           dyke area of KKNPP-3 to 6 and another one accident  on May 24, 2019 and operating satisfactorily since then.
           of serious nature occurred at Fabrication  Shop#2 in  RAPS-1 is shut down since October 2004. MAPS-1 was
           the infrastructure area of KKNPP-3&4. AERB reviewed  shut down since January 30,  2018  due to leak from
           these accidents  and measures to prevent recurrences  pressure tubes.
           of such incidents  in  future were recommended  and
           conveyed to the site for compliance. Further details are   All the 45 significant events occurred at operating
           given under section 1.8.2.                            NPPs were reviewed  in  detail  in  AERB  to see the
                                                                 adequacy  of investigations,  corrective actions, lessons
           (b) PFBR                                              learnt and the need for further regulatory actions. One
                                                                 significant event reported at RAPS-2, details of the
              Pre-commissioning/commissioning     activities  at  incident is given under section 1.8.1.
           PFBR are in progress. There was no major reportable
           incident at PFBR calling for enforcement action during   All fuel cycle facilities operated safely during  the
           the period.                                           period. However, there was one fatal accidents at IREL,
                                                                 OSCOM, the details of incident is given under section
           (c) KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8 and GHAVP-1&2
                                                                 1.8.2.
               There was one fatal accident at RAPP-7&8
           during major equipment erection and another one at  1.6 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES IN

           GHAVP-1&2 during excavation activities. AERB reviewed     CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION
           these accidents and concluded that the event was a result
           of lack of supervision, training and lack of safety work   Safety review of Variable Energy Cyclotron
           permit system. Measures to prevent recurrences of such  Centre (VECC), Raja Ramanna  Centre for Advanced
           incidents in future were recommended and conveyed to  Technology (RRCAT), Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
           the site for compliance. Further details are given under  Research (IGCAR), Electronics Corporation  of India
           section 1.8.2.                                        Limited  (ECIL)  and  Board  of Radiation  & Isotope
                                                                 Technology (BRIT) was done apart from the Fuel Cycle
           (d) KAIGA-5&6                                         Facilities. The status of R&D units and other facilities is

              There was no major reportable incident calling for   presented in Table 1.10.
           enforcement actions at KAIGA-5&6.


            22 AERB Annual Report 2019
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